A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the Self by Robinson, Howard
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIloSoPHY oF relIGIoN 5/1 (SPrING 2013), PP. 181-195
A ‘TRINITARIAN’ THEORY OF THE SELF
HOWARD ROBINSON
Central European University, Budapest
Abstract. I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex 
psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be 
dubbed ‘creativity’ or ‘imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it 
ascribes to the self these three ‘features’ or ‘moments’ and they bear at least 
some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo-
platonic, Augustinian tradition.
I. INTroDuCTorY remArKS
The theory of the self that I want to defend in this paper is trinitarian 
because it ascribes to the self three ‘features’ or ‘moments’ - with these 
expressions used in the most neutral sense possible – and these three 
bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity. In fact, the 
theory might be thought of as having more direct affinity with neo-
Platonism than with the Christian doctrine, though that there are 
important parallels there, especially in the Augustinian tradition, is very 
well known.
In order to construct this picture of the self, I shall, in some sections 
of this paper, draw on arguments that I have deployed elsewhere, and 
I  apologize for a  certain amount of repetition of previously published 
themes. I shall do this only to the extent necessary to make the argument 
presented here clear and plausible in its own right.
II. ouTlINe oF THe PoSITIoN
The three features of the self are as follows. First, the self is a  simple 
entity. This is a view that I have defended in various places, most recently 
in robinson (2011). Second, there is the obvious complexity of the Self, 
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as revealed in the fact that we all have many mental states and processes. 
This raises the obvious problem of how a  simple thing can also be 
complex. The third feature, which is connected with this latter problem, 
is the process or manner by which the essentially simple self expresses 
itself in the complexity of its psychology. I shall argue that the human 
subject is equally present in all these features or modes of its existence, 
that is, as a  simple metaphysical entity, as the complex psychology in 
which it is expressed, and in the process of expression that leads from the 
simple subject to the complicated psychology.
III. THe SImPle SelF
The argument for the simplicity of the self is currently under-discussed, 
although it seems to me to be an argument of considerable importance. 
I shall try to rehearse the argument with as much brevity as the need for 
persuasive detail will allow.
There is a long tradition of arguing that the identity of persons over 
time is not a matter of convention or degree in the way that is the case 
for complex physical objects – such as Theseus’s ship. There is something 
absolute – all or nothing – about one’s being numerically the same person 
at 70 as at 7.
but this intuition is controversial and does not command universal, 
or even general, assent. Growth, aging, and especially radical changes 
in personality due to accidents or diseases are claimed to make one into 
‘a different person’.
I  think that the issue can be made sharper and clearer, however, 
if one moves from considering identity through time to the rather 
less familiar matter of identity under counterfactual circumstances, 
especially those concerning origin. Instead of asking whether Theseus’s 
ship was the same object when half its planks had been replaced, we ask 
whether it would have been the same ship if it had been constructed with 
different materials in the first place. So we are not considering changes 
within its life as a  boat, but possible differences at its origin. Thus we 
are considering counterfactuals of origin, that is, things that might have 
been different at the beginning of the existence of an object. (Such things 
are counterfactuals because they state how things might have been, not 
how they, in fact, were.) We would probably agree that if the ship had 
been made not of wood but of gold, it would not have been the same 
ship at all. but if it had been made of, say, 10% different planks and 90% 
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the same ...? This thought experiment can be duplicated for any complex 
physical object. one might be tempted to follow Williamson’s epistemic 
line and say that there must be a fact, just one that is unbeknownst to 
us (Williamson 1994). I – and many others – have argued against that 
as a  treatment of vagueness elsewhere (robinson 2008-9). I  am going 
to assume that the correct response to such things is to say that there is 
no fact of the matter about whether it would or would not have been the 
same in the borderline cases. once the story has been told about such and 
such differences, those are all the real facts. There is more or less overlap 
of constitution, but what, if anything, one says about identity is a matter 
of choice. As I hope to show, a similar treatment cannot be meted out in 
the case of persons, when it comes to these counterfactual cases, even 
though it looked as if it could in the case of identity through time.
let us try to apply the same thought experiment to a human being. 
Suppose that a given human individual – call him Jones - had had origins 
different from those which he in fact had such that whether that difference 
affected who he was is not intuitively obvious. We can approach this by 
imagining cases where it seems indefinite whether what was produced 
was the same body as Jones in fact possesses. What would count as such 
a case might be a matter of controversy, but there must be one. Perhaps 
it is unclear whether Jones’s mother would have given birth to the same 
human body if the same egg from which the Jones body came, had been 
fertilized by a different though genetically identical sperm from the same 
father. Some philosophers might regard it as obvious that sameness of 
sperm is essential to the identity of a human body. In that case, imagine 
that the sperm that fertilized the egg had differed in a few molecules from 
the way it actually was; would that be the same sperm? If one pursues the 
matter far enough there will be indeterminacy which will infect that of 
the resulting body. There must therefore be some difference such that 
neither natural language nor intuition tells us whether the difference 
alters the identity of the human body; a point, that is, where the question 
of whether we have the same body is not a matter of fact.
These are cases of substantial overlap of constitution in which that 
fact is the only bedrock fact in the case: there is no further fact about 
whether they are ‘really’ the same object.
my claim is that no similar overlap of constitution can be applied to the 
counterfactual identity of minds.
To see why this is so, imagine the case where we are not sure whether 
it would have been Jones’ body – and, hence, Jones – that would have 
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been created by the slightly modified sperm and the same egg. Can we 
say, as we would for an object with no consciousness, that the story 
‘something the same, something different’ is the whole story: that 
overlap of constitution is all there is to it? For the Jones body as such, 
this approach would do as well as for any other physical object. but 
suppose Jones, in reflective mood, asks himself: ‘If that had happened, 
would I have existed?’ There are at least three answers he might give to 
himself. (i) ‘I either would or would not, but I cannot tell.’ (ii) `In some 
ways, or to some degree, I would have, and in some ways, or to some 
degree, I would not. The creature who would have existed would have 
had a kind of overlap of psychic constitution and personal identity with 
me, rather in the way there would be overlap in the case of any other 
physical object.’ (iii) `There is no fact of the matter whether I would or 
would not have existed: it is just a miss-posed question. There is not even 
a factual answer in terms of overlap of constitution.’
The second answer parallels the response we would give in the case 
of bodies. but as an account of the subjective situation, I claim that it 
makes no sense. Call the creature that would have emerged from the 
slightly modified sperm, `Jones*’. Is the overlap suggestion that, just as, 
say 85% of Jones*’s body would have been identical with Jones’ original 
body, and about 85% of his psychic life would have been Jones’? That it 
would have been like Jones’ - indeed that Jones* might have had a psychic 
life 100% like Jones’ - makes perfect sense, but that he might have been 
to that degree, the same psyche - that Jones ‘85% existed’ - makes no 
sense. Take the case in which Jones and Jones* have exactly similar lives 
throughout: which 85% of the 100% similar mental events do they share? 
Nor does it make sense to suggest that Jones might have participated in 
the whole of Jones*’s psychic life, but in a rather ghostly only-85%-there 
manner. Clearly, the notion of overlap of numerically identical psychic 
parts cannot be applied in the way that overlap of actual bodily part 
constitution quite unproblematically can.
It is important to notice how the identity across counterfactuals of 
origin case differs from that of identity through changes across time. 
It concerns what one might call empathetic distance, which is essential 
to the problematic nature of identity through time but irrelevant in the 
counterfactual case.
Suppose that my parents had emigrated to China whilst my mother 
was pregnant with me, and that, shortly after my birth, both my parents 
had died. I was then taken in by Chinese foster parents, lived through 
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the revolution and ended up being brought up in whatever way an alien 
would have been brought up in mao’s China. None of this person’s post-
uterine experiences would have been like mine. It seems, on the one 
hand, that this person would obviously have been me, and, on the other, 
that it is utterly unclear what kind of empathetic connection I can feel 
to this other ‘me’. If I ask, like Jones, `would this have been me?’, I am 
divided between the conviction that, as the story is told, it obviously 
would, and a complete inability to feel myself into the position I would 
then have occupied. This kind of failure of empathy plays an important 
role in many stories that are meant to throw doubt on the absoluteness 
of personal identity. It is important to the attempt to throw doubt on 
whether I am the same person as I would become in fifty years time, 
or whether brain damage would render me `a different person’ in more 
than a metaphorical sense. It is also obviously something that can be 
a matter of degree: some differences are more empathetically imaginable 
than others. In all these cases our intuitions are indecisive about the 
effect on identity. It is an important fact that problems of empathy play 
no role in the counterfactual argument. The person who would have 
existed if the sperm had been slightly different, could have had as exactly 
similar a psychic life to mine in as exactly similar environment as you 
care to imagine. This shows the difference between the cases I  have 
discussed and the problematic cases that involve identity through time. 
In those cases the idea of `similar but not quite the same’ gets empirical 
purchase. my future self feels, in his memory, much, but not all, of what 
I  now feel. In these cases, overlap of conscious constitution is clearly 
intelligible. but in the counterfactual cases, imaginative or empathetic 
distance plays no essential role, and the accompanying relativity of 
identification gets no grip.
We have considered (ii), the option that its identity might be a matter 
of degree and rejected this. but what about (iii), the suggestion that 
there is no fact of the matter whether I would or would not have existed? 
This boils down to the thought that there is no firm difference between 
qualitative similarity and numerical identity: degree of similarity of 
personal history is the only fundamental relation between the two cases. 
After all, we have a strong feeling that there must be more in the case of 
bodies, yet we seem to have been forced to accept that this is not the case. 
Could our sense that there must be such a distinction in our own case be 
an illusion? Is that conception of the self which makes us feel so sure that 
someone physically just like me but with a  somewhat different origin 
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either is me or is not, something that needs ‘deconstructing’, after the 
fashion of Derrida, Nietzsche or Hume?
I do not think that the idea ‘just like me but the idea of whether it 
would be me or not has no content’ can be made acceptable. Whereas 
in the case of physical objects we can see, after a little thought, that the 
qualitatively similar gives us all we thought we needed by talking about 
particulars, it will not do this in the case of minds.
Consider the following example. Suppose you discover that, in the 
very early stages in the womb, you were one of twins, but that the other 
did not develop, and that it could have easily happened the other way 
round; the other would have survived and you died in the first few 
days. The similarity between you as survivor and your twin, had he 
survived in your stead, both in genetic endowment and environmental 
circumstances and subsequent experience, could have been almost 
complete. Nevertheless, there is no sense that, on reflection, it makes 
no serious factual difference, concerning your own fate, which of the 
two survived. Just as it is true that, if your parents had never met, then 
you would not have existed, equally, if the other bundle of cells had 
developed instead of yours, you would not have existed. This is, in no 
sense, a matter of decision, convention or degree.
So it would seem that we can conclude that the only possible answer 
to the question which I  supposed Jones to have asked himself above, 
‘if that had happened, would I  have existed?’ is (i), ‘I  either would or 
would not, but I cannot tell. If there is a real fact, independent of our 
convention or decision, in this case, then it shows that counterfactual 
identity facts are real facts in the case of minds, in a way that they may 
not be for physical objects.1
one might respond to this argument by claiming that the difference 
between the twins is quite clear: they come from different physical 
sources and so have different bodies. This is true but misses the point of 
the story. If I am convinced that I would not have existed, this does not 
1 I  have not discussed or allowed for David lewis’s notorious modal realism. 
According to lewis, every possibility represents a completely different spatio-temporal 
system. So the sentence ‘I might have had a fried egg for breakfast yesterday’ (though 
I did not) is made true by the existence of a universe spatio-temporally unrelated to this 
one in which someone otherwise just like me (my ‘counterpart’) did have a fried egg for 
breakfast on the parallel day. on this view, in the most basic sense, nothing at all sustains 
counterfactuals, because all other possibilities are realized in counterpart entities, which, 
strictly speaking, are different things from the objects in the world we inhabit.
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mean simply that another body would have existed. It states a  further 
fact, even if it is one that depends or supervenes on the identity of the 
physical body. but then we have to see how this further fact copes with 
the indeterminate cases. If there is a real fact in the twin’s case, and we 
cannot answer the indefinite cases in way (ii), with some ‘more or less’ 
answer, how is one to move from robust fact to there being no fact at all? 
once it is established that there really is something at stake, the nihilist 
option does not seem to be available. If there is a real issue for clear cases, 
there will be an indeterminacy as to when unclear cases start. There will 
be an analogue of higher order vagueness here: there is no clear move 
from clear fact to no fact.
IV. HoW DoeS THouGHT DerIVe IN 
or From THe THINKING SubJeCT?
The argument of the previous sections attributes to the conscious subject 
a unity and simplicity, but one might wonder how something as complex 
as a  human subject can be a  simple entity. People have a  variety of 
faculties and capacities, and an almost unlimited number of memories, 
beliefs, desires, etc.; what does it mean to say that such an entity lacks 
parts or composition?
The modern theory of thought and active expression in general 
is computational. on this picture, the complexity of our mental life 
derives from a  complex source, namely the programme that governs 
the computation and the innate concepts of a  “language of Thought”. 
but the computational theory of thought has many problems. They all 
stem, I  think, from the fact that the computational theory of mind is 
necessarily a  syntactic theory of mind, and this is, in effect, a  form of 
epiphenomenalism. According to STm, the causal efficacy of thinking 
is due entirely to the physical structure of the language of Thought, 
not in any direct way to the meaning or propositional content of the 
symbols that constitute the language. Searle in his famous Chinese 
room argument showed that this is not sufficient to constitute conscious 
understanding (Searle 1980). There is also a large literature now which 
convincingly defends the view that there is a  phenomenology of 
thought and understanding. (See, for example, bayne and montague 
2011.) Fodor does not believe that understanding has anything to do 
with consciousness, but this is not plausible. even if a  non-conscious 
being could think as we think, it is not plausible that our consciousness 
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is epiphenomenal in relation to the results of our thinking. The idea 
that, in a  thoughtful discussion on a  complicated philosophical topic, 
one‘s consciousness has nothing to do with how one replies to one‘s 
interlocutor is no more plausible than the theory that how pain feels has 
nothing to do with how one reacts, or that the conscious visual experience 
of a tiger approaching has nothing to do with one‘s running away. but 
functionalism is the only physicalist game in town for consciousness, as 
it is in the form of the computational theory, for thought. It plainly will 
not do in either case: the situations are quite parallel. Searle once stood 
almost alone amongst the leading figures in the philosophy of mind in 
affirming this forcefully, but he has now been joined by Thomas Nagel. 
Nagel agrees that the syntactic-physicalist approach to thought, that tries 
to abstract it from both consciousness and the real efficacy of meaning 
and understanding, is hopeless.
I shall assume that the attribution of knowledge to a computer is a meta-
phor, and that the higher-level cognitive capacities can be possessed only 
by a being that also has consciousness (setting aside the question whether 
their exercise can sometimes be unconscious). That already implies that 
those capacities cannot be understood through physical science alone, 
and that their existence cannot be explained by a version of evolutionary 
theory that is physically reductive. (2012: 71)
The metaphor of the mind as a computer built out of a huge number of 
transistor-like homunculi will not serve the purpose, because it omits the 
understanding [italics added] of the content and the grounds of thought 
and action essential to reason. (2012: 87)
This has the consequence that, contra both Fodor and Dennett, the 
human mind is a semantic engine as well as a syntactic one. How are we 
to understand the idea that meaning as well as grammatical form drives 
our intellectual life? Fodor says that the STm is the only game in town, 
and, from a physicalistic point of view, that is true. but he also says of 
the computational model ‘the mind does not work that way’ (2001): it 
works only for those processes that are specifically modular, not for the 
‘common workspace’ in which the modules are brought together. This 
latter claim of Fodor’s is controversial, but it is consonant with reservations 
that Chomsky originally had about the use of his theory of language. As 
mark baker (2011) points out, this lacuna in the scientific explanation 
of thought was indicated by Chomsky fifty years ago. Chomsky divided 
language into three elements; the lexicon, syntax and the Creative Aspect 
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of language use. His theory, he claimed, had nothing to say about the 
last. This is, in part, at least, because understanding is not driven by 
syntax alone. This would suggest that the Creative Aspect of language 
use, and, hence, the development of thought, when that involves more 
than formal inferences, but also depends on our grasp of meanings and 
our understanding of our own projects, depends on something more 
than features of the neural/computational machinery. Perhaps the natural 
candidate for being the source of this creativity is the self.
The computational theory of mind has the mind as an essentially 
complex machine, but it fails. Can a more plausible theory be devised 
which reconciles both the metaphysical simplicity for which I  have 
argued and the manifold complexity of the way the mind expresses itself? 
Attempts to answer this question are liable to drive one into what russell 
somewhere described as ‘soupy metaphysics’ and I cannot venture too 
far into such territory here.2 Some insight into how one might approach 
the problem can be gained by considering the ‘unity in diversity’ that is 
an essential feature of thought.
Peter Geach has argued that the ‘activity of thinking cannot be assigned 
a position in the physical time-series’ (1969: 34). His reason for this is 
that, though the expression of a thought using a sentence will be spread 
through ordinary time, one’s grasp on the content must come as a whole. 
If it did not, then by the time one had reached ‘1066’ in the sentence ‘the 
battle of Hastings took place in 1066’ one’s consciousness of the other 
components of the thought would have passed into history. What the 
sentence expresses as a whole is the thought of which one is conscious. 
Something that has an essential unity finds expression in something that 
is complex. The position seems thus to be the following. The expression 
of a thought in a sentence is spread out in the normal ‘flowing’ empirical 
time. but the thinking of the thought which, in some sense, ‘lies behind’ 
(but not necessarily temporally before) this, is not temporally structured 
in the same way. Something which is implicit in the thought is laid out 
explicitly in the sentence. one experiences a thought in a sentence – or 
sometimes in other, non-verbal, images – but as a  unity that a  mere 
string of sounds or images does not possess.
Isn’t this a  somewhat mysterious doctrine? It is, but it is true to 
the phenomenology of thought. It can also be illustrated by appeal 
2 For a  ‘non-soupy’ defence of simplicity rather different from mine, see Chisholm 
(1991).
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to the distinction between two forms of potentiality. These forms of 
potentiality can be found in Aristotle, but also, I think, in our common 
conception of how things work. A hot object may be potentially cold, 
but to become cold is simply to change a  property. ‘Potentialities’ in 
this sense signify the range of changes of which an object is capable. 
but when one exercises a  specific ability – even more so, when one 
articulates a previously implicit thought – this is not a simple change, 
but a realization or externalization of something that was there but not 
‘laid out’ in an explicit form. And Geach’s point is that, when laid out or 
expressed it still retains the unity originally possessed, otherwise it could 
not be the expression of the content that it is.
Just as the complexity of a sentence or proposition expresses some-
thing which is, in a sense, a more primitive unity, perhaps the relation 
of the self to its various modes of expression is similar to this. In trying 
to make sense of this I  shall draw on the neo-platonic account of the 
relation of the one and Intellect, and Aquinas on the Trinity – which are 
themselves, of course, connected.
V. PloTINuS, oNe AND INTelleCT
Plotinus’s metaphysics is based on the idea that intellectual complexity 
can unfold from the essentially simple, and he believes that this extends 
to the individual human subject.
one must, then, assume that a simple thing thinks itself, and investigate 
as far as possible how it does so ... (Ennead V.3. 1)
... we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the one 
beyond being ... and next in order there is being and Intellect, and the 
nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these 
three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think they are present also 
in ourselves ... (Ennead V. 1. 10)
This naturally strikes the modern reader – especially the analytic one – 
as totally opaque. but, with the help of Geach’s remarks concerning 
the unity of thought given above, perhaps we can entertain the idea 
that there may be a  distinction between two kinds of simplicity. one, 
which we might call ‘minimal simplicity’, is the idea that something is 
simple when it possesses only one essential or internal simple feature. 
The other, which one might label ‘undifferentiated simplicity’ is when 
something possesses a nature which can only be expressed by attributing 
a complex set of properties but when those properties do not exist in the 
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thing as separately identifiable elements. This latter idea is, of course, 
a controversial one. Traditional theology talks of God’s properties in this 
way, but the unity of thought seems similar to this, and, I am suggesting, 
the relation of the ‘simple self ’ to its expression, in thought and action, 
is also analogous.
How are we to characterize the movement that is the expression of 
ourselves in thought and action? The CTm (which, if complete, would 
also be a Computer Theory of action, or, at least, volition) thought of 
this as a computational process, but we have rejected that. The inclusion 
of the semantic or meaning element introduces something which is, 
in a  sense, informal, and could be designated “intelligence” or even 
“imagination” or “creativity”, in a  sense of those latter terms in which 
they differ little from intelligence construed in a  wide ranging way. 
The account is “trinitarian” in that it gives the self three elements or 
moments: its essential simplicity, its expression as intellect and intelligent 
action and the process by which it moves from one to the other, namely 
imagination, creativity or intelligence.
It is not, I  think, adequate to think of this as one thing – the self 
which is simple – doing other things, namely expressing itself through 
its intelligence. The interdependence of the elements is greater than this: 
they are the essence of the self. Plotinian language seems to me to be 
here appropriate. Talk of emanation or procession and return captures 
the informal intelligence by which the self expresses and ‘unpacks’ itself 
in thought and action and keeps returning to its implicit resources to 
develop and grow as a person handling himself in a world.
VI. AQuINAS, THe TrINITY AND THe SelF
What are the similarities and differences in form between what I have 
claimed about the self and the western doctrine of the Trinity? First, the 
similarities. both theories face the problem of how one can have an entity 
that is both simple and very rich (in God’s case, infinitely so) in nature. 
both involve a  source paired off, so to speak, with something which 
constitutes its articulation or expression – the Intellect or logos. And 
these two are related by a dynamic principle which is what enables one 
to be an expression of the other and both to communicate their nature.
both theories claim that there is one substantial thing which has, 
in its own essential nature, three moments. The parallel between the 
two is that there is a sense in which one thing is equally present in its 
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metaphysically simple nature, in its plural, intelligent manifestations and 
in the process of unfolding the simple essence into this complexity.
but it is at this point that the differences become salient. It is a vital 
difference between the human self and the Divine Trinity that an 
individual human being is not three persons, so the presence of the 
self in its three moments does not give rise to three hypostases, three 
individuals. Given the similarities I  have above claimed there to be, 
should it not be the case that we are, in some such way, triune?
The best way of approaching this problem is by trying to understand 
what Aquinas means by saying that the three persons of the Trinity exist 
by being substantial relations, for, by contrast, in our case the relations are 
not substantial in the sense of giving rise to three individuals. exploring 
this difference can, I believe, help in explaining both this approach to the 
self and the meaning of Aquinas’s account.
VII. THe DIFFereNCe beTWeeN ourSelVeS AND THe TrINITY
Aquinas does have a  serious problem in explaining the notion of 
substantial relations. The persons have to be individuals, so they cannot 
simply be ordinary relations between the parts of one thing. on the other 
hand, they cannot be separate substantial things, for that would be tri-
theism. The Divine nature must be communicated to the three hypostases 
sufficiently fully to make them individual enough to each be designated 
‘persons’, but not to such as to make them separate substances.
Aquinas claims that one substance – what is more, an absolutely simple 
one - can be three persons because of a relational structure internal to it.
For [the Persons] are many by reason of the distinction of subsistent 
relations, yet one God, nevertheless, by reason of the unity of subsistent 
essence. (SCG, IV, 14, 14)
The unity of the essence does not consist, as with people collectively, 
in the sharing of the same kind or species, in the manner of a universal 
with many instances, but in being the very same particular instance. The 
problem is with the role of the subsistent relations: how can relations 
within one substantial thing generate three individuals that can be truly 
categorized as persons?
This apparent contradiction makes sense if one takes as one’s model 
the nature of the self, and this is what Aquinas does. He argues that, in 
thinking, something is generated which does not require that there be 
something which receives the thought, in contrast with what is the case 
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when someone produces a child, or a table, in which case there must be 
some matter that receives that which forms of the new entity. A thought 
is produced by a thinker, but it is not made out of something separate. 
The logic behind Aquinas’s argument is, I think, this. If an object of kind 
F can generate something distinct from it of the same kind, but not by 
imprinting F-ness in some separate matter, then what is generated is not 
a different instance of F and so is substantially the same.
It might be helpful here to consider Aquinas’s account of angels. 
because they lack matter, each is a subsistent form and so they must all be 
of different species in order to be different individuals. This can prompt 
the thought that if (per impossibile in the case of angels) a subsistent form 
could replicate itself the result would be a complex which was, in a sense, 
two things and in a sense not.
The first worry that may arise with this approach is that it rests too 
much on the Aristotelian idea that it is matter that individuates, so 
that, if there is no matter involved, there cannot be two instances of the 
same form qua universal involved. This is, indeed, a very controversial 
principle, but I think we can defend Aquinas’s overall position without 
relying on this principle, by emphasizing the analogy with thought. It 
is true that the thinker, or intellect, creates thoughts out of himself, or 
itself, but not out of any alien matter. but the problem will now be that 
the thought is not sufficiently ‘other’ from the thinker for it to be parallel 
to the case of a generated person. How can we combine the insight we 
can gain from the analogy with thought with the comparison with 
‘impossible twin angels’? The former helps explain the possibility of 
the generation of one thing from another without their being different 
substances, whilst the latter offers a model of the completeness of each 
individual so generated.
The difference between the Trinity and the human self becomes 
relevant here. There is a very limited sense in which we are a kind of 
trinity. There is a  sense in which we are present in each of the three 
moments – in the simple self, in the outward expression of ourselves 
and in the process of moving from the one to the other. And we do have 
a kind of internal dialogue within ourselves between these moments.
I am present in the simple self, in the complex manifestations of my 
life and thinking and in the process from one to the other, but not wholly 
in any of them alone. but because we are finite creatures operating within 
time, our whole nature is never communicated between these personae, 
so to speak. I do show my nature in what I think and do, but only, so to 
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speak, in dribs and drabs. I think that it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
this is a feature of embodiment. We are dependent both on the brain and 
on the phenomenal realm, in the form of images and words, to work out 
and express our thoughts. This ensures that our whole nature cannot be 
articulated at once. (For an attempted account of embodiment which 
tries to explain these dependencies, see robinson 1989.)
It is different in the case of God. What God shows forth in uttering 
the Word and in expressing His love (or will – the analogy varies) is 
always and eternally His full essence. So the very same individual essence 
has three complete expressions. everything that is the Divine essence 
is eternally expressed in the Word and is contained in the Spirit that 
represents their dynamic link. This is why they are not simply actions 
of the Father, but forms of the Divine essence. In our case they are 
expressions of our nature, not communications of it whole.
VIII. CoNCluSIoN
The account I have tried to develop can be taken on a variety of levels. 
many mainstream philosophers, from Descartes to Chisholm, have 
defended the view that the self is a  simple entity, and they therefore 
face the question of how this squares with the plurality of our mental 
features. I have tried to suggest how we might understand this. but, in 
the course of so doing I’ve drawn on the neo-Platonic account of the 
one and Nous, linked by the process of emanation and return. Finally, 
I  compare this to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. our essential 
but finite and dependent simplicity images the absolute transcendent 
unity of the Father, our stumbling attempts at embodied rational self-
expression parodies the perfect rational self understanding of the logos, 
and the creativity that ties them together in us palely images the role 
of the Holy Spirit. We are thus shadows and images of the Trinity as 
a whole, but, according to orthodox Christian doctrine, if these features 
in us are to be something better than a vain reflection of our maker, they 
must somehow be incorporated in the their origin and source.3
3 Acknowledgment: This paper was originally presented in munich, at a conference 
for the Analytic Theology Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
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